

CLOSING REMARKS TO MID-CAREER COURSE
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- I. FOR SIX WEEKS YOU HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO BRIEFINGS BY TOP OFFICERS OF CIA AND SOME SENIOR PEOPLE FROM ELSEWHERE IN GOVERNMENT. YOU HAVE LEARNED A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE AGENCY AND ITS MANY FUNCTIONS. BY NOW, HOWEVER, YOU PROBABLY HAVE HAD YOUR FILL OF SITTING FOR HOURS AT A TIME AND LISTENING TO SOMEONE LIKE ME LECTURE YOU. THUS, I INTEND TO MAKE ONLY A FEW GENERAL REMARKS.
- II. BY WAY OF PUTTING SOME OF THE THINGS YOU HAVE HAD THROWN AT YOU INTO PERSPECTIVE, LET'S BACK OFF FOR A MOMENT AND CONSIDER A FEW OF THE QUALITIES THAT MAKE AN ORGANIZATION, LIKE CIA, REALLY TICK.
 - A. I WOULD PUT PROFESSIONALISM AT THE TOP OF ANY LIST.

- B. ~~Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP80M01066A001400430001-1~~ PROFESSIONALISM IN INTELLIGENCE REQUIRES OBJECTIVITY, HARD
WORK, IMAGINATION, AND SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT ABOVE ALL
IT REQUIRES SOUND JUDGMENT AND MATURITY. PROFESSIONALISM IS
THE QUALITY THAT MAKES THE REALLY TOUGH TASK LOOK EASY, THE
QUALITY OF ACCEPTING DISAPPOINTMENT ALONG WITH ACCOMPLISHMENT.
- C. BASED ON MY ASSOCIATION WITH CIA OF ALMOST 20 YEARS, I BE-
LIEVE THAT CIA AND ITS OFFICERS POSSESS THE QUALITY OF PRO-
FESSIONALISM IN AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE.
1. BUT WE IN CIA MUST NOT REST ON OUR LAURELS. WE MUST
NOT BECOME SMUG OR BUREAUCRATIC.
 2. WE SHOULD ALL DO WHAT WE CAN TO STRENGTHEN AND IMPROVE
OUR PROFESSIONALISM.

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3. WE MUST TRAIN THOSE BELOW AND CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE
FOR NEW IDEAS, NEW APPROACHES, AND NEW DEVELOPMENT.

4. WE MUST ADMINISTER AND WE MUST SUPERVISE PROPERLY.
WE MUST KNOW OUR PEOPLE. THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT
ADD TO AND STRENGTHEN PROFESSIONALISM MUST BE COM-
MUNICATED BY FORCE OF EXAMPLE.

D. ALTHOUGH I HAVE REJOINED CIA ONLY IN MID-APRIL, I THINK THAT
PROFESSIONALISM HAS BEEN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT DURING THESE
PAST TWO OR THREE YEARS WHICH HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH UNFAVOR-
ABLE PUBLICITY ABOUT CIA. THIS QUALITY HAS ENABLED THE IN-
DIVIDUAL OFFICER, HIS UNIT AND THE AGENCY AS A WHOLE TO CON-
TINUE THE JOB IN AN EXPERT AND LEVEL-HEADED FASHION.

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I HAVE BEEN PROFESSIONALISM DEMONSTRATED IN THE FIELD, IN VIETNAM, WHERE AGENCY PEOPLE DID A FINE JOB.

E. SO I URGE EACH MEMBER OF THIS MID-CAREER COURSE: "LET'S CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THIS HIGH STANDARD OF PROFESSIONALISM."

III. SECONDLY, LET'S LOOK AT THE MATTER OF BROADENING AN OFFICER'S VIEWPOINT AND HIS GRASP OF THE AGENCY.

A. I HOPE THAT THESE SIX WEEKS HAVE HELPED EACH OF YOU TO REALIZE THAT IN MANY INSTANCES WHAT AN INDIVIDUAL OFFICER BELIEVES TO BE A GOOD COURSE OF ACTION ON SOME ISSUE IS NOT NECESSARILY THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION FROM THE DIRECTOR'S POINT OF VIEW.

B. THE BRIEFINGS, AND THE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES YOU HAVE HAD

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WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES SHOULD AID YOU IN OVERCOMING THE
TENDENCY TOWARD WHAT I MIGHT CALL "TRIBALISM" THAT SEEMS
TO DEVELOP IN LARGE ORGANIZATIONS. THIS IS THE MENTAL RUT
OF THE PERSON WHO SEES THE PROBLEMS OF HIS OWN SHOP--HIS
OWN DIVISION OR OFFICE OR CAREER SERVICE OR EVEN HIS
DIRECTORATE--BUT WHO LACKS THE PERSPECTIVE OF SEEING THE
PROBLEMS FACING OTHER PARTS OF THE AGENCY OR CIA AS A WHOLE.

- C. THUS, I STRONGLY URGE EACH OF YOU AS YOU RETURN TO YOUR
REGULAR ASSIGNMENTS TO KEEP AN OPEN MIND AND TO WORK HARD
AT DEVELOPING AN "AGENCY POINT OF VIEW" AS VARIOUS ISSUES
AND PROBLEMS ARE RAISED.

IV. FINALLY, I'D LIKE TO STATE MY BELIEFS THAT CIA WILL REMAIN

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VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY FOR YEARS TO COME, AND THAT EXCELLENCE IN INTELLIGENCE WORK STRENGTHENS OUR PROSPECTS FOR MAINTAINING PEACE. BUT THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGENCY WILL CONTINUE ONLY SO LONG AS OUR PEOPLE CONTINUE TO BE THE BEST AND DO THEIR BEST. WE CAN'T COAST LONG ON A GOOD REPUTATION. YOU HAVE TO LIVE UP TO IT EVERY DAY AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF EVERY TASK.

- A. EACH OF YOU CAN BE PROUD OF CIA AND ITS WORK.
- B. THE DIRECTOR CERTAINLY IS, AND I WOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT I AM PROUD TO BE INCLUDED AMONG YOUR NUMBER.
- C. WE LOOK TO OUR PEOPLE TO CARRY THAT PRIDE INTO THE FUTURE.

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DDCI TALK

[REDACTED]

22 SEPTEMBER 1969

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WHEN [REDACTED] INVITED ME TO ADDRESS YOU TODAY, HE LEFT THE TOPIC OPEN. SO I THOUGHT I WOULD TALK ABOUT "TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE." NOW, THIS TURNS OUT TO BE A PRETTY BROAD TOPIC, AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING THE MORE IMPORTANT AND PERSISTENT TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE REMINDS ME OF THE DILEMMA OF A YOUNG


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AND SO IT IS WITH "TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE." THE TOPIC IS CERTAINLY MORE OPEN TO A SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION, AND A  CHOICE OF SUBJECTS, THAN IS THE MATERIAL WHICH I UNDERSTAND YOUR SPEAKERS USUALLY COVER. BUT IS IS, I BELIEVE, MOST IMPORTANT

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THAT WE WHO ARE ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE WORK TAKE TIME OUT OCCASIONALLY, STAND BACK FROM OUR DAY-TO-DAY PROBLEMS, AND ASSESS WHERE WE STAND AND IN WHAT DIRECTION WE ARE MOVING. ONLY IF WE DO TAKE STOCK AT REGULAR INTERVALS, CAN WE CHART A COURSE FOR OURSELVES, INSTEAD OF MERELY REACTING TO AND KEEPING PACE WITH THE PRESSURES AND PROBLEMS THAT AFFECT US ALL.

A. SO LET ME TRY TO IDENTIFY FOR YOU SEVERAL OF THE TRENDS WHICH STRIKE ME AS HAVING A SIGNIFICANT AND PERSISTENT INFLUENCE UPON OUR BUSINESS.

I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PUT AT THE TOP OF THIS LIST THE GROWING PROBLEM OF GEOGRAPHICAL ACCESS FOR LOCATING ABROAD OUR INTELLIGENCE

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BASES AND FACILITIES. A DECADE AGO, THE AMERICAN PRESENCE SERVED AS A REASSURING SYMBOL OF SECURITY TO THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES. AS THE COLD WAR HAS THAWED OUT MORE AND MORE IN THE 1960's, HOWEVER, OUR INSTALLATIONS ON FOREIGN SOIL, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES, HAVE BECOME LESS WELCOME GUESTS. NOW THE AMERICAN PRESENCE, PARTICULARLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, IS BEING EXPLOITED BY COMMUNIST PROPAGANDISTS AND NATIONALIST AGITATORS WHO PORTRAY IT AS "IMPERIALIST" OR "COLONIALIST" DOMINATION.

CLEARLY WE ARE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURES TO WITHDRAW OR REDUCE, OR TO PAY EVER LARGER "RENTS" IN THE FORM OF MILITARY AND

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ECONOMIC AID, OR A LARGER SHARE OF THE INTELLIGENCE TAKE. NO PARTICULAR INSIGHT IS REQUIRED TO SEE THAT WE WILL GENERALLY FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO SECURE ACCESS TO AND USE REAL ESTATE IN COUNTRIES BORDERING THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC. AS A CONSEQUENCE, WE MUST DEVELOP ALTERNATIVES. THESE INCLUDE TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES SUCH AS MOBILE PLATFORMS, BOTH TERRESTRIAL AND AIR OR SPACE BORNE. ANOTHER TYPE OF SUBSTITUTE, IN PLACES WHERE WE CAN STILL GET A FOOT IN THE DOOR, IS THE MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS CONSPICUOUS INSTALLATION WHICH CAN BE OPERATED BY FEWER PERSONNEL.

THIS TREND APPLIES TO THE FACILITIES OF ALL PARTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN SOME COUNTRIES CIA HAS EXPERIENCED

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2. A CHANGE IN WHAT WE CALL "THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT." YOU KNOW THAT A GOOD "OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT" IS ONE WHERE LOCAL SECURITY AND POLICE FORCES COOPERATE WITH US, OR AT LEAST CLOSE THEIR EYES TO OUR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TERRITORY OR FACILITIES OF OUR TARGETS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE ATTITUDE OF THE HOST COUNTRY IS OFTEN A CRITICAL FACTOR IN MOUNTING CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS. THE CHANGE THAT I ALLUDED TO CONCERNS CERTAIN COUNTRIES WHERE COOPERATION HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN OR THE ATTITUDE HAS BECOME HOSTILE.

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THIS SHIFT IN ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR FACILITIES AND INTELLI-

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3. GENCE OPERATIONS IS ALSO PART OF A HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY, ABROAD AS WELL AS IN THE UNITED STATES, TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. PART OF THIS AWARENESS AND HOSTILITY HAS BEEN AROUSED BY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY CAUSED BY OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE INTELLIGENCE. THE U-2 SHOOT DOWN OVER THE USSR; THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY AND THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO BY THE NORTH KOREANS; THE FAIRLY NUMEROUS INCIDENTS OVER THE YEARS INVOLVING ELINT AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS THE EC-121 OFF KOREA; THE ARREST AND JAILING OF AGENT PERSONNEL AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE FLAPS HAVE CAUSED FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR NEWS MEDIA TO BECOME PRETTY TWITCHY WHERE INTELLIGENCE

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MATTERS ARE CONCERNED. THIS IS NOT TO POINT A FINGER OF FAULT, BUT SIMPLY TO STATE A FACT OF LIFE. WHEN WE RUN RISKS, WE EXPECT ACCIDENTS TO OCCUR.

THIS SENSITIVITY DOES NOT, HOWEVER, STEM FROM INTELLIGENCE INCIDENTS ALONE. THE CHANGE IN ATTITUDE IS, IN PART, A RESULT OF THE RECOGNITION OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF GOOD INTELLIGENCE IN TODAY'S WORLD. I'LL COME BACK TO THIS POINT. BUT THE COMMUNIST BLOC HAS ALSO EXPLOITED INTELLIGENCE INCIDENTS TO THE FULLEST, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE AND PROPAGANDA CHARGES, AS A PART OF THEIR GENERAL ANTI-U.S. CAMPAIGN. AND LOCAL COMMUNIST

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ELEMENTS HAVE AGITATED A GREAT DEAL. THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE COMMUNIST STATES HAVE TRUMPED-UP CHARGES OF ESPIONAGE AGAINST INNOCENT WESTERN TOURISTS. THEY HAVE ALSO MUDDIED THE WATERS THROUGH A CAMPAIGN OF FORGERY AND VILIFICATION DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. INTELLIGENCE. CIA ESPECIALLY HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF THIS EFFORT IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WHETHER THE HOST GOVERNMENT ACTS FROM GREED, RESENTMENT OR HOSTILITY, OR IS SIMPLY UNABLE TO STAND THE HEAT OF OPPOSITION CRITICISM, THE RESULT IS THE SAME--THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TURNS CHILLY.

THE ASSUMED UBIQUITOUS CHARACTER OF CIA IS MOST HUMOROUSLY

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4. FOREIGN SENSITIVITY TOWARD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS ITS COUNTERPART WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN ADDITION TO THE INCIDENTS MENTIONED ABOVE, YOU ARE ALL FAMILIAR WITH THE PUBLICITY GENERATED BY THE DISCLOSURE OF CIA SUPPORT TO U.S. STUDENTS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE DIRECTED AT OVERSEAS TARGETS. THERE HAS BEEN A RASH OF SPY LITERATURE AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS. ALL THESE HAVE COMBINED TO SENSITIZE CERTAIN SECTORS OF PUBLIC

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OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES. MANY DOMESTIC CRITICS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAVE DEVELOPED A KIND OF KNEE-JERK REACTION. THEY DO NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE PURPOSES OF INTELLIGENCE, AND THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION INTELLIGENCE MAKES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY IMMEDIATELY RUSH TO BELIEVE THE WORST AND ISSUE FORTH WITH BLANKET CONDEMNATIONS.

PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT I AM NOT TRYING TO MAINTAIN THAT MISTAKES HAVE NOT OCCURRED, OR THAT THE RISKS WE RUN HAVE NOT OCCASIONALLY BEEN MISCALCULATED. I AM SAYING THAT GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE CRITICS ALIKE SHOULD TRY TO BE OBJECTIVE AND TO KEEP

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THE EQUITIES--AS WELL AS THE OCCASIONAL DISADVANTAGES--IN MIND WHEN THEY DISCUSS THE SUBJECT. WE CAN BE OF SOME HELP BY CONDITIONING OUR PRIVATE ATTITUDES ALONG THAT SAME LINE.

ANOTHER FORM OF CRITICISM OFTEN PRODUCED BY MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CRISES CONCERNS ACCUSATIONS OF AN "INTELLIGENCE FAILURE." THE ERECTION OF THE BERLIN WALL, WARS AND COUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THE DOMINICAN CRISIS, THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM AND MANY OTHER MAJOR EVENTS HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY CHARGES THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE FAILED TO PROVIDE WARNINGS.

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AS YOU KNOW, INTELLIGENCE WARNING HAS, IN FACT, BEEN GIVEN PRIOR TO MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF THESE CRISES. PUTTING ASIDE THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THE CRITICS ARE WELL INFORMED, THE CHARGE OF FAILURE USUALLY STEMS FROM ONE OF TWO FACTORS. THE FIRST INVOLVES THE INTELLIGENCE WARNING ITSELF. JUST HOW PRECISE CAN INTELLIGENCE BE EXPECTED TO BE IN PREDICTING HOSTILE ACTIONS? OBVIOUSLY IT IS DESIRABLE THAT WE GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF EXACTLY THE WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW AND WHY OF THE HOSTILE ACTION OR DEVELOPMENT. THIS DEGREE OF PERFECTION HAS SELDOM BEEN ATTAINED IN THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE. ONE BENDS EVERY EFFORT TO GIVE THE POLICY MAKER THIS KIND OF WARNING, BUT ONLY RARELY IS IT

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POSSIBLE TO PENETRATE THE ENEMY'S PROTECTIVE BARRIERS SUFFICIENTLY TO PROVIDE A FULLY RELIABLE, DETAILED NOTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE PRECISE NATURE OF A HOSTILE ACTION.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN IS THAT IN MANY CASES OF SO-CALLED FAILURES, WE HAVE PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS, BUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT--FOR VARIOUS REASONS--HAS NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. THE CONSTRAINTS OF TODAY'S WORLD SOMETIMES MAKE IT A LOSING PROPOSITION TO ACT ON WHAT WE KNOW. THIS IS CERTAINLY FRUSTRATING.

IN OTHER CASES, POLICY-MAKERS ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT AN

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INTELLIGENCE WARNING WHICH IS NOT PALATABLE AND WHICH WOULD REQUIRE ACTION. THIS IS THE PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE CREDIBILITY. IN EITHER CASE THE UNINFORMED CRITIC CONFUSES DISMAY, WHICH STEMS FROM OUR INABILITY TO ACT, WITH WHAT HE THEN CALLS "SURPRISE".

6. ANOTHER FACTOR WE MUST FACE IS THE CONSTANTLY IMPROVING SECURITY OF OUR PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE TARGETS. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THIS IS THE OLD RACE, WELL KNOWN IN MILITARY MATTERS, BETWEEN THE OFFENSE AND THE DEFENSE AS IT APPLIES TO INTELLIGENCE.

THE DEFENSIVE ABILITIES OF OUR MAIN TARGETS SEEM TO GROW AS THE PRESENT LIMBO BETWEEN REAL PEACE AND MAJOR WAR LENGTHENS OUT. DURING MILITARY HOSTILITIES, INTELLIGENCE OPPORTUNITIES

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TEND TO OPEN UP, AS THE ENEMY'S SECURITY SLACKENS.

AS WE LEAVE WORLD WAR II FURTHER BEHIND, THE SECURITY OF OUR INTELLIGENCE TARGETS BECOMES BETTER ORGANIZED AND MORE EFFECTIVE. AS A RESULT, EVER MORE EXTENSIVE, COSTLY AND IMAGINATIVE EFFORTS ARE REQUIRED TO PENETRATE THE SECURITY BARRIERS AND TO PRODUCE HIGH LEVEL INTELLIGENCE RESULTS.

B. THE TRENDS I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING SO FAR LARGELY CONCERN THE WORLD OUTSIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--OUR INTELLIGENCE TARGETS, THIRD COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES, AND OUR CRITICS. LET US IDENTIFY A FEW TRENDS WITHIN THE PROFESSION ITSELF.

ALTHOUGH THE FUNDS EXPENDED AND THE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN

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INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ARE CLOSELY GUARDED, IT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD

1. THAT BOTH HAVE BEEN STEADILY INCREASING FOR THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS. APART FROM INFLATIONARY PRESSURES AT HOME AND ABROAD, THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS.

2. OBVIOUSLY, WITH SUCCESSIVE PAY RAISES, OUR PERSONNEL COSTS HAVE RISEN, AND THIS IS NO SMALL ITEM. BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT HAS BEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED SYSTEMS TO COLLECT AND EXPLOIT DATA OBTAINABLE BY SOPHISTICATED SENSORS. THE SYSTEMS ARE LARGE AND COSTLY, AND THEY REQUIRE HIGHLY SKILLED PERSONNEL. MANY OF THEM USE MOBILE PLATFORMS OR ARE DESIGNED FOR OPERATION IN UNUSUAL LOCATIONS. THEY OFTEN GOBBLE UP VAST

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QUANTITIES OF DATA WHICH REQUIRE EXPENSIVE EFFORTS FOR REDUCTION AND PROCESSING, BEFORE THE DATA BECOME USEFUL TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS. THE DECISION TO DEVELOP AND OPERATE ONE OF THESE SYSTEMS IS USUALLY A "BIG" DECISION, INVOLVING HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS IS ONE WAY TO OVERCOME SOME OF THE PROBLEMS I REFERRED TO EARLIER, SUCH AS THE IMPROVING SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORT OF OUR MAIN TARGETS, AND THE GROWING LIMITATIONS ON OUR USE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES. BUT THE IMPETUS TO OPERATE THESE SYSTEMS ALSO STEMS FROM OUR DESIRE TO PRODUCE BETTER INTELLIGENCE FOR THE

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POLICY MAKER, THE OPERATIONS OFFICER AND THE FORCE PLANNER. TO
DO THIS REQUIRES USING, AND MANY TIMES PUSHING, THE STATE-OF-THE-
ART--AND TO DO SO IS COSTLY.

3. ANOTHER STIMULUS TO THE EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND
BUDGETS IS THE GROWING INTEREST OF OUR POLICY MAKERS IN EVERY AREA
OF THE WORLD. BEFORE 1960, THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE PRIMARY FOCUS
OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THE SOVIET UNION AND (MORE RECENTLY) COM-
MUNIST CHINA CONTINUE TO BE OUR NUMBER ONE TARGETS, BUT THE AP-
PETITES OF OUR CUSTOMERS NOW EXTEND TO THE POLITICAL, MILITARY
AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF ALMOST ANY COUNTRY YOU MAY CARE TO NAME.
THESE APPETITES ARE GETTING MORE VORACIOUS WITH EACH CRISIS. THUS,

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IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST A MINIMUM COLLECTION EFFORT AND ANALYTICAL EXPERTISE ON EACH AND EVERY OUT-OF-THE-WAY COUNTRY, AGAINST THE MOMENT WHEN IT MAY BE PROPELLED INTO THE HEADLINES THROUGH A COUP, A WAR, OR SOME OTHER NATIONAL UPHEAVAL.

4 THERE IS YET ANOTHER TREND AFFECTING US ALL AS A RESULT OF THE GROWING DOLLAR AND PERSONNEL COSTS OF INTELLIGENCE. I REFER HERE TO THE PRESSURES FOR ECONOMY IN INTELLIGENCE. THE REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL ABROAD IS ONE MANIFESTATION OF THIS. I AM SURE WE AGREE THAT EACH MEMBER AGENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS OCCASIONALLY SUNK A DRY HOLE AND MAY DO SO AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. BUT IN TODAY'S CLIMATE IT IS VITAL THAT WE ALL BE ECONOMY-MINDED.

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IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD WORK HARD TO ELIMINATE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE OUTMODDED OR OF MARGINAL USEFULNESS--JUST AS HARD AS WE WORK TO ACHIEVE AN IMPORTANT NEW ADVANCE. GIVEN THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET, CERTAINLY THE ECONOMY TREND WILL CONTINUE TO BE WITH US AND IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT WE RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES ON PERSONNEL AND FUNDS.

5. NOW, WHAT ABOUT THE FRUITS OF OUR LABOR? THE TREND HERE IS THE MOST REASSURING AND SATISFYING OF ALL. IT IS THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF MANY THAT OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STANDS AT A LEVEL WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SURPASSED IN THE PAST TWO DECADES. BUT, WE

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MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT AS OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT HAS IMPROVED, THE THREATS FACING THE UNITED STATES HAVE ALSO GROWN. THE ENVIRONMENT OF 1969 AND THE 1970'S IS A MUCH MORE DANGEROUS ONE THAN WAS THAT OF THE EARLY SIXTIES OR THE 1950'S. THE USSR HAS MANY MISSILES THAT CAN REACH OUR TERRITORY AND THEY CARRY SOPHISTICATED AND POWERFUL NUCLEAR WARHEADS. COMMUNIST CHINA IS BEGINNING TO DEVELOP THE SAME WEAPONS. OUR INTELLIGENCE IS BETTER, BUT IN THE FACE OF THE THREAT, ITS NET CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY MAY, THEREFORE, BE LIMITED. THUS, WE ARE FACED WITH THE NEED TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE OUR INTELLIGENCE,

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PARTICULARLY REGARDING ENEMY INTENTIONS AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

OUR COMBAT INTELLIGENCE HAS ALSO MADE SOME SUBSTANTIAL GAINS DURING THE COURSE OF THE VIETNAM WAR. I WOULD LIKE TO RELATE JUST ONE EXAMPLE, BASED ON FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE IN THE EYE CORPS AREA, OF HOW WE PUT A VARIETY OF TECHNIQUES TOGETHER IN ORDER TO LOCATE THE LARGE ^{120mm ROCKETS} ~~MORTARS~~ USED BY THE VIET CONG.
(DISCUSSION OF EXAMPLE)

SPEAKING OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT AS A WHOLE, WE HAVE SUFFICIENT FEEDBACK FROM TOP U.S. POLICY MAKERS TO KNOW THAT INTELLIGENCE IS PLAYING A ROLE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE IN THEIR

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DECISION MAKING ON MANY OF THE MOST CRITICAL ISSUES FACING OUR GOVERNMENT TODAY. THE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD KNOW HOW OFTEN KEY FIGURES IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMUNITY AND OUR DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST USIB VIEWS ON A VARIETY OF SPECIAL SUBJECTS. THESE REQUESTS ARE FREQUENT, AND THEY BEAR ON MOST OF THE CRITICAL DECISIONS FACING OUR TOP LEADERS.

IN TAKING SATISFACTION IN THE PRESENT HIGH STATUS AND VALUE OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT, I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT WE CAN AFFORD TO BE SMUG. A TRULY PROFESSIONAL GROUP AVOIDS THIS PITFALL, FOR AS HOLY WRIT HAS IT, "PRIDE GOES BEFORE A FALL."

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NOR CAN WE IN THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AFFORD THE SHORTSIGHTEDNESS OF INDULGING WHAT I WOULD CALL A "TRIBALISTIC" ATTITUDE OF SEEING ONLY THE PROBLEMS OR INTERESTS OF ONE'S IMMEDIATE SHOP OR AGENCY. WE MUST WORK HARD TO FOSTER A SPIRIT OF GENUINE COOPERATION, WHEREBY WE ALL SEE OUR PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TOTAL EFFORT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IF WE HOLD TO HIS APPROACH, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE ALREADY RECOGNIZED AND STILL GROWING VALUE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WILL OUTWEIGH ALL OF THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE TRENDS I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH YOU TODAY.

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Opening Remarks for Project [REDACTED]
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I. Welcome to CIA Headquarters.

a. Hope Project lives up to its name.

b. Objectives of Project are:

(1) Familiarize you with what CIA really does



(2) And explain Agency's relationship to DoD.

[REDACTED]

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II. DCI's job.

- a. Principal intell. advisor to President, and 
- b. Chief coordinator of National Intell. activities. (USIB).
- c. Also advises as to performance and value of National Intell. programs. (NIPE and NIRB)
- d. And responsible for performing special services of common concern to Intell. Community. (FBIS, NPIC, etc.) 

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
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(Agency is DCI's staff to help him do his job.) 

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III. Some misconceptions about CIA need clearing up!

- a. Not lousy with money:



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- b. Emphasis not on Political Action and Propaganda:


Vast bulk of Agency resources go to positive intell.
(80% of money and more than 95% of people)

- c. Not free of constraints:

IV. Some controls on DCI.



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- a. Money and what it goes for closely scrutinized by BuBud and Congress.
- b. Programs and Intell. Community relations reviewed by PFIAB.
- c. Special activities controlled by 303.
- d. Overseas activities known to and controlled by Amb.,
And must be in accord with National Security goals as
 concurred in by NSC, and approved
by President.
- e. Major intell. actions and policy decisions coordinated with USIB.

V. DCI collaborates closely with DoD and State.

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- a. Tuesday lunch with President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.
- b. Periodic lunch with SECDEF and DepSECDEF.
- c. Also collaborates through various committees, e. g., NSC, ~~██████████~~ 303 and USIB.

Member